The perceived importance of "special interest group" money in election campaigns motivates widespread use of caps on allowable contributions. We present a bargaining model in which the effect of a cap that is not too stringent on the amount a lobby can contribute improves its bargaining position relative to the politician. It thus increases the payoff from lobbying, which will therefore increase the equilibrium number of lobbies when lobby formation is endogenous. Caps may then also increase aggregate contributions from lobbies and increase politically motivated government spending. We present empirical evidence from U.S. states that support various predictions of the model. We find a positive effect on the number of PACs formed from enacting laws constraining PAC contributions. Moreover, the estimated effect is non-linear, as predicted by the theoretical model. Very stringent caps reduce the number of PACs, but as the cap increases above a threshold level, the effect becomes positive. Contribution caps in the majority of U.S. states are above this threshold.
Introduction
A leading concern about the political system in the United States and many other democracies is the influence of money on politics, and, more specifically, the influence of special interest groups (SIGs) on policies and elections via their ability to contribute money to politicians. 1 Regulating contributions that can be made to politicians is therefore seen as a crucial aspect of political reform.
Towards this end, many countries have contribution limits, where the most obvious regulation is a cap on the size of contributions made by lobbies or interest groups. 2 Contribution caps are generally expected to lower the influence that SIGs have, both individually and as a group, by lowering the amount of SIG money in politics. Given their centrality to campaign finance reform, the effect of contribution limits on SIG influence is one of the most important questions in this area.
The basic argument that contribution caps will reduce the influence of SIGs on political outcomes ignores the possible effect of contribution caps on the bargaining position of existing SIGs relative to the government, as well as the effect of caps on the incentives for new SIGs to organize. In this paper, we present a model where SIGs and politicians bargain over an economic policy that the politician can implement in exchange for contributions. In this framework, binding contribution caps can improve a lobby's bargaining position and increase the return to lobbying. 3 Intuitively the cap allows a lobby to credibly offer a smaller contribution for any given level of the policy for which it is bargaining, i.e. it improves the lobbies' terms-of-trade in the exchange of contributions for economic policy favors. 4 When the binding cap is not too stringent it improves the lobbies' bargaining position, thus increasing the return to lobbying and the number of lobbies formed. We derive conditions under which this endogenous increase in the number of lobbies implies an increase in both the total amount of contributions and the level of distortionary policies or total government spending that favors SIGs. 1 Such concerns are not new. Craig (1978, p. 506) notes that Gustav Stresemann, the leading political figure in Weimar Germany in the late 1920s, felt that legislation limiting political contributions might be necessary in that period to curb the influence of vested interests. 2 For example, France, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, United States. See www.aceproject.org. 3 Ansolabehere, et al. (2003) argue that caps on PAC contributions at the federal level in the U.S. are generally not binding (though there are PACs for which caps are binding). At the state level, caps are far more often binding, perhaps because they are at a lower level. We were able to collect data for a number of recent state gubernatorial races. In the Florida gubernatorial race of 1998, 90% of the contributions for Jeb Bush that we could identify as coming from PACs were at the cap of $500, while 80% of PAC contributions for the challenger Mackay were at the cap. In Montana in 1996, 97% of contributions for the winner Racicot that we could identify as coming from PACs were at the cap of $400; in Kansas in 1998, over 50% of PAC contributions to the winner Graves were at the cap of $2000. (In each case, the challenger was considered weak and received little PAC money.) In other states, we also found a significant fraction of contributions at the cap, though this is for individual and PAC contributions taken together. Our empirical results below are for states, and they suggest that caps do in fact have the effect we hypothesize. 4 Note that this effect is derived independently of whether a cap is set on other lobbies. It may therefore help to explain why some US companies such as Time Warner, General Motors and Monsanto have voluntarily adopted restrictions on political contributions even before any federal law was enacted.
Though one may be tempted to draw policy conclusions, our purpose in this paper is not normative, that is, to prescribe optimal campaign finance reform, but rather to examine possible effects of caps on lobby formation. Some welfare implications of alternative reforms are discussed in our working paper.
Caps can also affect lobby formation when there is interaction between lobbies. One particularly relevant form of interaction in the context of campaign finance reform is that large increases in contributions from alternative sources increases the "price" that a politician can charge a lobby in exchange for policy favors. We capture this effect by modelling diminishing marginal benefits from aggregate contributions to politicians. This generates an additional channel through which lobbies gain from contribution caps: an increase in the marginal benefit of their contribution allows them to obtain the same policy level at a lower contribution. Although we do not consider competing lobby groups with opposite ideological interests in the model-the policy SIGs care about is purely distributional-this form of interaction implies that the effect on bargaining power that underlies our results is not due to the absence of opposing interests by lobbies since their actions have negative pecuniary externalities on other lobbies.
Our focus on bargaining between the SIG and the politician over the exchange of policy favors for campaign contributions is motivated by empirical studies showing that contributions from Political Action Committees have a significant influence on the voting behavior of Congressmen (see, for example, Stratmann [2002] ). Although contributions are also motivated by the desire to have the preferred candidate elected, there is considerable evidence that contributions influence how legislators allocate time, how they act in committees, and how they vote on the floor (Hall and Wayman [1990] , Stratmann [1998] ). 5 A plausible question is whether our theoretical result on a cap inducing formation of new lobbies reflects an existing lobby splitting up into more than one lobby to circumvent the cap; but this is not the case. We rule this out by simply assuming that the cost of forming a second lobby is too high relative to the additional benefit from lobbying that arises from circumventing the cap. We are not asserting that this assumption is likely (or unlikely) to hold. We are making it in the theoretical model in order to focus on a less obvious effect of the cap on the number of lobbies that has the potential to generate truly new lobbies. In the empirical work we address the possibility that the increase in the number of lobbies is due to a split-up effect and show that is not the effect we capture.
Our theoretical results are also not due to any asymmetries between the benefits from caps to already formed versus newly formed lobbies, nor to lobby competition.
To test the key prediction that a restriction on existing lobbies can actually increase the number of lobbies, we take advantage of the fact that U.S. states that imposed contribution limits did so at different points in time. We construct a measure of the number of state political action committees (PACs) to use as our dependent variable and, using a difference-in-differences approach, estimate that on average the implementation of caps on contributions from PACs increases their number.
Since the probability of adoption of campaign finance laws may depend on the number of lobbies, we re-estimate our regressions using an instrumental variable estimator to address this potential endogeneity problem. We confirm the positive effect of caps on the number of PACs and find that the result is in fact strengthened considerably. However, we fail to reject exogeneity and thus place greater confidence in the more conservative estimates.
We also find that the effect of caps on PACs is not linear. A cap that is too stringent lowers the number of PACs, but a cap above a certain threshold increases it, both effects are exactly as predicted by the model. The critical threshold is fairly low, with the caps for many of the U.S. states lying significantly above it. Our estimates also indicate that prohibitions on contribution from corporations and unions that do not take place through PACs increase the number of PACs. This is consistent with the prediction from the extended version of the model with lobby interaction. Throughout the estimation we control for state and time fixed effects as well as for other basic state determinants of PAC formation, including population, income, and government revenue. We also account for two important parameters in the model-lobby bargaining power in a state; and the share of informed voters. The findings here are also consistent with the model: an increase in lobby bargaining power is positively correlated with the number of PACs created, as is a decrease in the share of informed voters. This latter information effect on the number of lobbies is another novel finding of the paper.
There is an increasing amount of theoretical work on campaign finance reform, with implications for the effect of contribution limits, but much of this work focusses on different issues. Prat (2002) and Coate (2003 Coate ( , 2004 consider models in which contributions finance advertising and perhaps policy favors as well. Contribution limits may either raise or lower social welfare depending on a number of model characteristics, including the nature of advertising (directly versus indirectly informative). In contrast to our paper, the existing theory assumes that the number of interest groups does not change once campaign finance reform is implemented, so that the phenomenon central to our results plays no role. 6 In Riezman and Wilson (1997) the number of lobbies may change in response to contribution limits, which may lower social welfare when there are asymmetries between two politicians seeking election or their supporters. A key difference is that in their model contributions and government policies are not determined by bargaining between lobbies and the government. Hence, our key effect that caps may strengthen the bargaining position of existing (symmetric) lobbies and thus induce lobby formation does not arise.
Empirical work on lobby formation, on the other hand, has largely ignored the effect of campaign finance reform. The focus has been on examining the industry characteristics that determine whether an industry has PACs and how much each contributes. Such variables include industry size, concentration and whether it faces government regulations on its economic activities. (Pittman [1988] , Zardkoohi [1988] , Grier, Munger, Roberts [1994] ). Hart (2001) uses firm level data and finds that the probability of a large high-tech firm forming a PAC is higher if it has larger sales, is subject to government regulations on its economic activities and varies with the regional location of the corporate headquarters.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the basic setup. In section 3 we derive the effect of caps on the number of lobbies, the total amount of contributions, and the level of distortionary policy. In section 4 we derive the effect of caps when the model is extended to allow for lobby interaction. In section 5 we provide empirical evidence of the positive effect of campaign finance reforms in US states on PAC formation. The final section contains a discussion and summary of the implications of the main results and how they can be extended to incorporate additional motives for caps. Proofs of our main propositions are in an appendix.
Model
The underlying framework is similar to Grossman and Helpman (1994) with some key differences that we will point out. We consider a small open economy in which individuals are identical except, possibly, for different endowments of non-labor factors. We represent utility as:
where the subutility functions, u, are twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave. The term x n , represents the consumption of the numeraire good, n, which is produced using only labor with a marginal product of unity. This, along with the assumption of a fixed world price of n at unity and a sufficiently large labor force, implies the wage is unity. We assume symmetry across the non-numeraire goods and thus denote their common exogenous world price by p. For given prices an individual who owns the specific factor i has income E i and chooses consumption to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint, x n + P i px i ≤ E i . Given the assumptions on the subutility, the budget constraint is satisfied with equality and individuals demand d(p) = u 0 (p) −1 of each of the nonnumeraire goods, identical for all goods in the absence of consumption taxes or tariffs. An individual's indirect utility is simply the sum of income, E i , and consumer surplus,
. Production of the non-numeraire goods requires labor and a specific factor to be combined according to a constant returns technology. Since the wage is unity the return to the specific factor depends only on the supplier price of the good, p s i . The reward to the specific factor is given by the quasi-rent π(p s i ) and equilibrium output is π 0 (p s i ), where again for simplicity we assume symmetry across sectors in this case in the production function. In the absence of production or trade taxes the producer and world prices are identical.
To redistribute income to lobbies representing capital owners in sector i the government uses (for concreteness) a unit production subsidy, t i . 7 Transfers to lobbies are financed by lump-sum taxes charged on the overall population of N individuals. We assume that the government balances its budget every period, so that each period it must raise P i∈L t i π 0 (p + t i ), 8 where L is the endogenously determined set of sectors that are organized as lobbies at a given point. For simplicity we assume that each of the members within any given lobby own a similar amount of capital and labor. For organized sectors gross welfare is:
where α i is the share of the population that are factor owners of capital in sector i, which we assume is a negligible part of the overall population. They therefore take the size of the budget, P i∈L t i π 0 (p+t i ), as given and do not lobby for it to be reduced. This assumption allows us to focus on the interaction 7 What policy is used for redistribution is an important and interesting question in itself, but not one we address. show how a production subsidy can arise as the government's optimal redistribution policy in a framework similar to that used here. 8 In a small open economy the consumer prices are determined by the world price so they are independent of the production subsidy. Production subsidies affect quantities produced and lower individuals' income but this will only result in lower consumption of the numeraire good.
between the government and the lobbies in the absence of any lobby competition effects. Thus the lobby maximizes its gross welfare net of its provision of contributions, which is given by:
Social welfare is then represented by:
Contributions are used by politicians to make campaign expenditures in order to attract votes in an electoral framework. Following Baron (1994) and Grossman and Helpman (1996) , we assume that there are two types of voters: "informed" and "uninformed". The first are unaffected by campaign advertisements or other expenditures financed by contributions, while the second can be attracted by higher campaign expenditures. All contributions are used for campaign expenditures on impressionable voters. They assume that the fraction of impressionable votes one party gets relative to the other is simply a function of the absolute difference in their campaign expenditures, that is, in the contributions they succeed in raising. Under some additional assumptions about functional forms, a politician whose objective is to maximize total votes can be represented as having the objective of maximizing a weighted sum of social welfare and contributions: 9
As in Grossman and Helpman (1996) we therefore take maximization of (5) as representing the behavior of a politician who solicits contributions from SIGs to maximize his electoral prospects.
Of course, alternative modeling of how contributions are used to influence election outcomes won't lead to the simple form of (5). 10 However, as long as neither side has all the bargaining power, the basic positive results we derive below-that contribution caps that are not too stringent will make lobbies better off and thus give new lobbies the incentive to form-are more general than the specific rationale in the previous paragraph for politicians to desire trading transfers for contributions. On the other hand, the welfare implications of caps, for example, may depend crucially on exactly what functions campaign expenditures serve.
The twin assumptions of additive separability of contributions in G and concentrated factor own-9 See our working paper for details. 10 In Coate (2004) , for example, contributions finance informative messages that a candidate is qualified. ership (α i → 0) imply that there is no economic interaction among lobbies. In many instances interest groups lobby for policies such as production subsidies in their own sector so modelling away motives for lobby competition is not only theoretically useful but also a plausible representation. We introduce a form of lobby interaction below, but for now we restrict our attention to the bargaining between a politician/government and each individual lobby separately. The lobby will offer a contribution in exchange for a production subsidy and the interaction with the politician takes the form of Nash bargaining, as in . This type of interaction differs from the menu-auction approach in Grossman and Helpman (1994) where lobbies simply make the government a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Allowing for Nash bargaining leads to key differences in the results, as will be clear below.
Contribution Caps and Lobby Formation
To derive the effect of contribution caps on the formation of lobbies, we solve the model backwards. First we show the effect of caps on the net welfare for a given lobby. We then model an initial stage of lobby formation and show how contribution caps can induce new lobbies to form by increasing the net welfare of a lobby. Given the symmetry assumptions we made, once a lobby is formed it behaves identically to all others so that, in the second stage, we can focus on a "representative" lobby.
Unconstrained Political Equilibrium
In the absence of contribution caps the political equilibrium in the second stage after lobbies have formed is a pair (C, t) that is efficient, and divides the maximized joint surplus to the politician and lobby according to the bargaining power of the lobby, λ. Since contributions enter linearly in both the politician's and the lobby's objective they are used to divide the surplus, whereas the production subsidy is set to achieve a politically efficient outcome. The solution is illustrated in Figure 1 , where the vertical line at t = t * represents the contract curve defined by the following condition:
where subscripts represent partial derivatives. This condition reduces to
[ Figure 1 here]
The equilibrium contribution level, C * , is then set to divide the surplus such that the utility levels obtained by maximizing the Nash product subject to the Pareto frontier are satisfied:
where v m is the maximum utility for the lobby when the politician is maintained at his reservation utility, g 0 , the level of utility when both t and C are zero (or are combined in a way that provides equal utility). Given the linear Pareto frontier we have the following solution for the utility levels G * and V * of the unconstrained political equilibrium:
where we note that g m −g 0 = v m −v 0 because both politician and lobby value contributions identically and, given t * , contributions are the only variable that determines the utility level. Point N in Figure 2 represents the Nash bargaining equilibrium in the absence of caps, implying an equilibrium contribution level C * .
[ Figure 2 here]
Contribution Caps
We can now show how an exogenously imposed cap can increase the net welfare of existing lobbies.
Proposition 1 (Effect of caps on lobby payoffs)
i. There exists a set of binding contribution caps, C i ⊂ (0, C * ), that strictly increase lobby i's net welfare iff its bargaining power λ i ∈ (0, 1).
ii. If lobby i has all (none) of the bargaining power, λ i = 1 (0), then any binding contribution cap strictly (weakly) decreases its net welfare.
iii. There exist sufficiently low binding caps that strictly decrease the net welfare for a lobby i with
iv. Any lobby i with λ i ∈ [0, 1] is indifferent between any cap on other lobbies C j ∈ [0, ∞) for j 6 = i.
Proof: See Appendix
The first part of the proposition captures a direct bargaining effect: the cap improves the lobby's bargaining position by allowing it to credibly offer a smaller contribution for any given subsidy. The result is illustrated in Figure 1 where N c represents the constrained equilibrium and V c > V * is the lobby's utility. The contract curve is identical to the original one as contributions are increased up toC. Any further transfer of utility from the lobby to the government can only come through lower subsidies so the contract curve becomes the horizontal segment through N c and g mc . We can also see that the maximum government utility is now lower but if the cap is above C 0 the lobby can still attain v m . 11 Using this information we represent the bargaining solution in Figure 2 by N c . For contributions belowC the new Pareto frontier is identical to the unconstrained one, which is represented by the dashed line. When the subsidy level is reduced below the politically efficient level of t * the joint bargaining surplus falls so the new Pareto frontier falls below the original one.
Moreover, it is simple to show that the slopes of the two frontiers are identical at the last point where they coincide,C and t * , therefore the new frontier is steeper and strictly concave. The increase in the steepness of the Pareto frontier implies that it is more costly to obtain increases in government utility for a given reduction in lobby utility, so since the bargaining solution for a given Pareto frontier, is itself efficient it will feature higher utility for the lobby. It is simple to show (as we do in the appendix) that for some caps the improvement in bargaining position for the lobby more than offsets the decrease in overall bargaining surplus from the cap.
The basic intuition behind this proposition is that the cap effectively changes the terms-of-trade between contributions and subsidies (the policy "price" the government must pay to get contributions) in the SIG's favor -the SIG can say to the government that for any policy it can pay less in the constrained equilibrium. When such a change in the terms-of-trade in the SIG's favor is a credible threat in bargaining, the SIG will be better off under the conditions in the proposition. 12
The effect on the lobby's net welfare is reversed if it has all the bargaining power (λ = 1), as part
(ii) points out. In that case the lobby appropriates all the bargaining surplus and any constraint such as a cap reduces that surplus and leaves the lobby worse off. This special case is important because it forms the basis for the political equilibrium in the work of Grossman and Helpman, and 11 We can also see that after a binding cap is imposed there will be some unexplored joint gains from bargaining so the government's iso-welfare at N c , given by the curve G c , is flatter than V c , therefore unlike the unconstrained equilibrium condition in (6) we have G t /G c > V t /V c at N c . 12 If we recall that the Nash bargaining solution can be obtained as the limit of an alternating offers game we can also see the parallel between this and the standard result in such bargaining models, whereby an agent who can credibly constrain his maximum offer is made better off.
papers that follow them, whose underlying model structure we share. Conversely, if the lobbies have no bargaining power (λ = 0), as assumed by Coate (2004) , then caps have no effect on their utility.
Therefore the Nash bargaining solution with intermediate bargaining power generates very different results that could not possibly be predicted by considering either of the extremes.
The third part of the proposition notes that for a sufficiently low cap all lobbies will be worse off, (only weakly so if they have no bargaining power). This is obvious if a cap is set to zero since then the lobby is prevented from bargaining and obtaining any surplus. Therefore it is also true for some positive cap. As the cap is raised it eventually reaches a level C at which a lobby is indifferent relative to the unconstrained case. There exist caps between C and C * that leave the lobby with higher net welfare than under no caps.
Given the additive separability of contributions in G and the concentration of factor ownership, each lobby is indifferent to caps on other lobbies. This along with part (i) of the proposition imply a basic corollary: all lobbies with intermediate bargaining power benefit from an overall binding cap on contributions, provided it is not too low. Note that this is true even in the absence of lobby interaction/competition effects that may lead to too much lobbying from each lobby's perspective. Note also that with α i → 0, the net utility of unorganized sectors (which is equal to their gross utility W i ) is independent of the existence of contribution caps and of the number of sectors that do organize.
With a fixed number of symmetric lobbies, n * , and no lobby interaction (so that each lobby would contribute C * in the absence of a cap), an enforceable binding cap on the contributions of each lobby lowers the total amount of contributions by (C * − C)n * . The equilibrium subsidy rate falls, as is clear from the solution N c in Figure 1 and therefore the total level of taxes required to fund those subsidies also falls. Therefore a cap has the expected effects when the number of lobbies is given-there is less money in politics, fewer distortions. It also leads to higher social welfare in our setting where lobbies have no positive informational role.
There are a number of interesting comparative statics, but here we point only one. An increase in a-a higher government weight on social welfare-will cause a reduction in transfers when there are no caps, which will generally also reduce the equilibrium contribution. This implies that the threshold contribution cap, must also be lower in order to bind.
We now turn to endogenous lobby formation to show how the improvement in a lobby's net welfare due to contribution caps leads to new lobbies forming, and under what conditions this leads to larger total contributions and more distortionary policies.
Lobby Formation
Consider now the first stage of the political process, namely the decision of groups on whether to form lobbies. Lobbies form if the return to being organized in the second stage, which we have just analyzed, exceeds the cost of lobby formation. We begin with the cost of forming a lobby. Following Mitra (1999) we assume that specific factor owners in any of the H sectors may potentially form a lobby, where the fixed cost (in terms of labor) of forming a lobby in sector i is F i . This cost is assumed to differ across sectors because the set of owners for different factors that will potentially organize may differ in their geographical concentration, their organizational ability, or other reasons.
For simplicity, this cost of formation will be the only difference across potential lobbies. Denoting by V u the net welfare of an unorganized sector, a sector i will organize as a lobby if
where under our symmetry assumptions, the left-hand side is identical for all i. Note further that, in the above set-up, α i → 0 implies that both V and V u are independent of n, the number of sectors that have organized as lobbies.
Suppose we relabel the sectors that can potentially form, i = 1, ..., H, to reflect their fixed costs in ascending order, so that sector H now denotes the sector with the highest fixed organization cost.
so that sectors 1 to n * form lobbies when there are no contribution caps and sectors n * + 1 to H do not. The marginal lobby n * is determined by the largest F i such that (12) holds.
For simplicity, assume now a continuum of sectors that can organize as lobbies so that ordering the sectors as in (13) implies that F i is continuous in i as well. 13 We may then represent the fixed cost of formation through a function F (n) where the ordering convention in (13) implies that F 0 (n) > 0.
In this case the equilibrium number of lobbies is determined by an analogue to (12), namely:
where, to repeat, the left-hand side of (14) is independent of n when α i → 0. Hence, F 0 (n) > 0 implies that there is a unique solution to (14). We assume that once a group incurs the fixed cost it can enforce the collection of contributions from each of its members perfectly. In this case it is simple to show that the expected Nash equilibrium of the game played by the members within each group in deciding whether to pay their share of the fixed cost leads to the formation of lobbies up to the point where (14) is satisfied. 14 The effect of caps on equilibrium lobby formation follows immediately and intuitively. A binding contribution cap that is not too stringent raises V , provided λ ∈ (0, 1) as shown in proposition 1, while leaving V u unchanged. Therefore the equilibrium number of lobbies is higher under a cap.
Note that when λ = 0 the equilibrium number of lobbies is identical with or without the cap and when λ = 1 the equilibrium number is lower. 15 The following proposition summarizes the effects of caps on the number of lobbies and the subsequent effects on contributions and subsidies, where ε nκ represents the elasticity of the number of lobbies with respect to a marginal tightening of the cap at C * . Similarly, ε T κ refers to the elasticity of the total amount of production subsidy per existing lobby with respect to a marginal tightening of the cap at C * .
Proposition 2 (Contribution caps, lobby formation and total subsidies)
When λ = λ i ∈ (0, 1) for all i then the set of binding contribution caps, C i ⊂ (0, C * ), that strictly increase the net welfare V of all n * operating lobbies with λ i will:
i. Unambiguously lead to the formation of new lobbies with F > F(n * )
ii. Increase total contributions iff ε nκ > 1
iii. Increase total production subsidies and taxes iff ε nκ > −ε T κ
Conditions ii and iii are satisfied if either F 0 (n * ) is sufficiently low or F (0) is sufficiently high.
Proof: See Appendix
Part (i) of the proposition simply summarizes the lobby formation effect already described. Part
(ii) reflects the opposing effects of the cap on total contributions. Caps decrease individual contributions from existing lobbies, naturally the elasticity for those lobbies is unity, but it increases the number of lobbies that form and contribute, with elasticity ε nκ . Since once the lobbies form they 14 When there is more than one factor owner within the sector there is an incentive to free ride and not pay the formation cost that is also a Nash equilibrium to the lobby formation game played by factor owners within a sector. However, as Mitra (1999) argues, such an equilibrium does not survive simple refinements that involve pre-play communication such as Pareto-dominance or coalition proofness. 15 Note however that if n * lobbies were already formed and then an exogenous contribution cap is imposed any existing lobbies would still be operating since we are modelling the formation costs as fixed and sunk, which would imply no change when λ = 1.
are symmetric all that is required is that the elasticity of formation exceed the direct effect, ε nκ > 1.
Part (iii) provides a condition similar to (ii) for total production subsidies, which increase if sufficient new lobbies are formed such that the new subsidies now paid more than offset the decrease in the subsidy paid to the previously existing lobbies. The intuition is clear, if initially there are few organized lobbies then a tightening of the cap and resulting reduction in the subsidy rate will have a small effect on total production subsidies for existing lobbies. If that tightening leads to considerable lobby formation then the new equilibrium level of total production subsidies, Σ i∈L 0 t i π 0 i , increases. Note that n does not affect the equilibrium subsidy rate, t. The condition for taxes follows from the balanced budget constraint. 16 The conclusions of Proposition 2 imply that contribution caps, presumably meant to reduce the influence of special interests in the political process, may have just the opposite effect. Caps increase the number of organized lobbies and may increase total contributions and the policy distortions that contributions "purchase". 17 In section 5 we present empirical evidence that caps do in fact foster lobby formation, so the negative effects of caps are a real possibility. We first briefly discuss how lobby competition would affect our results.
Diminishing Returns to Aggregate Contributions and Lobby Competition
In the baseline case we modeled away all lobby interaction. One interaction that may be important is that the marginal benefit of any given contribution by a lobby depends on how much a politician collects from other lobbies. If he collects a lot, the marginal benefit of any given contribution may be low, so that each individual lobby will not be able to extract much from the politician in the form of policy concessions. We represent this by modifying the government objective so that total contributions are evaluated according to an increasing, concave function Ψ:
Since all lobbies make identical contributions, we may write the contributions term as Ψ(nC). If we retain the assumption that each lobby i bargains with the government only over the policy in its sector t i -which is reasonable if no lobby is too large-then it is simple to derive the additional effect of the contribution caps on the number of lobbies. In this case no individual lobby i has an incentive to offer contributions to the government to affect policies in other sectors.
We assume first that the contribution of any single individual lobby i is too small to change the marginal benefit of aggregate contributions, that is,
that a politician can extract from a lobby and still maintain the lobby at the reservation utility level v 0 . However, we further assume that there is a sufficiently large number of lobbies such that when a binding capC < C is set it increases the marginal benefit of aggregate contributions, that is,
The first assumption implies that the analysis of the direct effect of a cap on lobby i remains identical to parts i,ii and iii of proposition 1. The key difference is therefore that a cap on other lobbies will now benefit lobby i by raising the marginal benefit of its contributions.
In order to concentrate on the indirect effect on lobby i we consider the case where all other lobbies face a binding contribution cap, but lobby i's contributions are unrestricted. Since sector i lobbies only for t i and its contributions do not change the marginal benefit of aggregate contributions, the equilibrium t i is still defined as the solution to equation (6), which is now given bŷ
Given our assumption that Ψ 0 ((n − 1)C + C i ) ≈ Ψ 0 ((n − 1)C),t i is independent of the equilibrium C i for any politically feasible level of contributions. In order to compare the effect of a cap in this setup with the original one, we could normalize Ψ so that Ψ 0 ((n − 1)Ĉ +Ĉ i ) = 1, implying that in the absence of a cap,t i = t * . The effect on t i of a capC <Ĉ on contributions from other lobbies is then exactly equivalent to a reduction in the politician's weight on social welfare, a. This follows
The equilibrium production subsidy for i therefore increases with a cap on other lobbies.
The indirect effect of a cap on other lobbies on lobby i's utility is easy to derive. Givent i from (16) the equilibrium transfer is determined as before by maximizing the Nash product in (8). With no cap on i, the slope of the Pareto frontier is linear, but with slope −1/Ψ 0 ((n− 1)C) > −1/Ψ 0 ((n−1)Ĉ) (= −1 under the normalization above). With a linear Pareto frontier lobby i's equilibrium utility is given by (11). When α i → 0, the reservation value v 0 remains unchanged, while v m increases because the cap on other lobbies increases the marginal benefit of i's contributions, so that it needs to make a lower contribution to maintain the government indifferent relative to its reservation value.
Hence, the cap on other lobbies raises lobby i's utility when there are diminishing returns to aggregate contributions.
The argument above also holds exactly for the marginal unorganized lobby and therefore provides another channel by which caps increase the number of lobbies. Note that in deriving the indirect effect we did not impose any limits on the cap. In fact the lower the cap is the stronger the positive effect on i's utility. This contrasts with the direct effect derived in proposition 1 where the direct effect of sufficiently low caps is to lower lobby utility. Moreover, this indirect effect of caps in increasing the marginal benefit of individual contributions can apply to caps on any source of contributions that enter the aggregate contributions functions. This is another prediction that we will explore in our empirical work.
Caps and Lobby Formation: Evidence from Reforms in US States

Predictions
Using the definitions of V (.) and V u (.), we may write the equilibrium number of lobbies in (14) in terms of the exogenous variables in the model
We believe that the effects of caps on the number of lobbies applies in settings broader than our specific model. Therefore we do not limit ourselves to a structural estimation focused only on industry related lobbies. Instead we use a broader measure of lobbies-political action committees (PACs)-to test the main predictions of interest from the model: 18
1. The number of PACs depends on the existence of a limit on PAC contributions.
2. When lobbies have some but not all bargaining power then a cap, C, on all PACs increases n if that cap is not too low and decreases it otherwise.
3. In the presence of diminishing marginal benefits to aggregate contributions a cap on contributions from sources other than PACs, e.g. corporations or unions, increases the number of PACs. Note that, unlike the effect of caps on PACs, a cap on other sources has a positive effect on the number of PACs independently of how stringent it is.
Three secondary predictions arise directly from this model, but should also arise in a more general model. First, when lobbies have higher bargaining power they are more likely to form because contributions for a given subsidy are lower and thus the gain to organizing higher. Second, increases in the share of informed voters, a, leads the government to place more weight on their welfare and in equilibrium this lowers lobby utility. So increases in a lower lobby formation. In our model that occurs because increases in a imply a lower subsidy rate, as is clear from (7). Third, increases in the fixed cost of lobby formation lead to fewer lobbies.
Empirical Approach and Data
The basic estimating equation is:
where ln n is the log number of PACs in state i in election cycle t and 1(C it ) is an indicator of whether or not a state regulates contributions by PACs. We include time and state effects, respectively v t and µ i , as well as a number of time-varying state variables in the vector X it , which we relate to the theoretical model below. Our data range from 1986 to 2000. Since our unit of observation is an election cycle, we have eight observations per state.
Data on PAC state campaign finance legislation were obtained from the biannual publication Campaign Finance Law, from the Federal Election Commission. We classified a state as having no restrictions when the state allowed unlimited PAC giving to candidates for state offices (1(C it ) = 0) and having restrictions otherwise (1(C it ) = 1). To interpret β we can take the time difference of a state that implements a law and then subtract the difference of a state that did not. Then, conditional on the same X it , we can interpret β simply as the one time effect on the number of lobbies in that state from implementing a campaign finance law. So our basic approach to identify β is to use the Morehouse and Jewell (2003) discuss the role of PACs in state elections for the period 1990-91, using data from this source, based on classifications by the New York Times. However, they do not report their PAC count. 21 We classified those contributors as PACs when their name contained PAC, POLITICAL ACTION, etc. Next we grouped records by PAC name, so that spellings which differed only by punctuation, abbreviations, and spacing were not double-counted. Finally, the number of distinct PACs by state and year was tallied.
22 Gray and Lowery (1997) collected data on the number of lobbies at the state level, but their data overlap with our data set only in 1990 and 1997, giving us insufficient time variation in the data. Moreover, since we are interested in the effect of contribution caps on lobby formation, we require using lobbies that also contribute cash rather than all lobbies, and the Gray and Lowery data do not allow us to make this distinction. Thomas and Hrebenar (2004) importantly, those years overlapping with our sample are very close (1998 and 2000) it is unlikely that we have either enough variation or observations to identify the within correlation precisely. However, we do find that there is a positive correlation between the growth of the two measures between 1998
and 2000 and in fact a median regression of the growth of PACs measured by followthemoney.org and the one we use yields a coefficient of 0.56 that is significant at the 10% level.
We also performed an additional test to compare our proxy with the available state level data while accounting for cross-state variation. We expect that much of the cross-state variation in the number of PACs is driven by population (and possibly income per capita) for obvious reasons. In fact, the regression results in tables 2a and 2b indicate that population has a positive but insignificant effect on the number of PACs once state effects are controlled for. Even if we partial out the effect of these variables, population and income per capita, we continue to obtain a positive and significant relationship between the measure we use and that collected by followthemoney.org. We illustrate this relationship in Figure 3 below. It depicts a regression plot between the two measures after we have "partialled" out year effects and two key cross-state determinants for PACs: population and income per capita (all variables in logs). We can see the strong positive correlation and find that it is highly significant with a t-statistic of 4.9. 24 24 For this graph we used the balanced panel for the years 1998, 2000 and an OLS regression. The result is similar if we use a median regression or if we use the few existing observations for other years. The potential advantage of the balanced panel is that if population and income were able to perfectly account for cross-state differences, the remaining variation captured by this correlation would mostly be within state. To put it another way, with the balanced panel we try to minimize cross-state variation since each individual state observation added would add only across variation. Both the population and income variables have the expected positive effect on the state PAC measure. The effect for population has a t-statistic of 3, which indicates that it does account for much of the cross-state variation since in the specifications with the state-effects we found that it was insignificant.
[ Figure 3 here] Our approach also requires that the underlying state variable have some causal effect on the proxy we use. Otherwise we should find no effect of the state level caps on the number of federal SIGs since those caps should have no direct impact on how much a SIG donates to federal candidates and thus on the number captured by our proxy. We believe that such a causation from state to federal SIGs is plausible. One reason for it is that once a group of individuals in a state pays the fixed cost of organizing a lobby to influence state legislation it is then more likely to also contribute to candidates in federal elections (the federal lobbying activity payoff no longer needs to be particularly high since the fixed cost of organizing has been incurred). 25 This issue has two implications for the estimation and estimates. First, an estimated coefficient on 1(C it ) equal to zero may reflect either an absence of causation between the state and federal variables or a failure of our theory, i.e. β = 0. Second, a non-zero estimate suggests this causation is present and that β 6 = 0 since state reforms should not have a direct impact on our proxy. The last argument may not hold if the state reform variable is correlated with some omitted variable that determines the proxy. To address this concern we also employ instrumental variables.
A potential advantage of using the federal data is that it may address the problem of PACs forming under a different name in response to binding contribution caps in order to evade the cap.
In this case, a positive correlation could be observed between the cap and the number of state PACs, even though the cap did not induce formation of any really new PACs. Whether or not this occurs depends on the cost of setting up additional state PACs relative to the benefit of making contributions above the cap. To understand how the use of federal data is likely to minimize this problem consider the following case. PAC A is formed before a state law imposing a cap is passed and it lobbies at the federal and state level. After the state law is passed, the SIG represented by A finds it profitable to create another PAC, A new , to channel contributions above the cap at the state level. Since the cap binds only at the state level this SIG will have no motive to register the new PAC and use it to lobby at the federal level. Hence the federal data are unlikely to be contaminated by the split-up effect.
However, even with federal PACs the concern remains that PACs may decide to split into several PACs when facing a contribution limit for the reason mentioned, thus confounding the empirical results. To analyze whether this is a quantitatively important concern for our estimation, we also collected data on the identity of PAC sponsors from the FEC. Although PACs may split because of caps that is not the case for their sponsors. 25 Our approach is also valid in certain cases with two way causation between the state and federal variable. To proxy for the cost of lobby formation, c, we employ a measure of geographic concentration, similar to Trefler (1993) . Our measure captures if a given sector is relatively more concentrated in particular states. Greater geographical concentration may reduce the free-rider problem and thus the cost of organizing so if a state has a large share of an industry that is geographically concentrated we posit that PACs are more likely to form in this state. 26 Our proxy for a is a voter information variable, since the more informed voters are about the political process, the stronger the incentive of the politician to place more weight on the welfare of voters as opposed to contributors. We construct this variable using a recurring question in the biannual National Election Study (NES): "We're interested in this interview in finding out whether people paid much attention to the election campaign this year. Take newspapers for instance-did you read about the campaign in any newspaper?" The response was coded 0 if the answer was "No, read no newspapers about the campaign" and 1 when the response was "Yes, read newspaper(s) about the campaign." Each individual is identified by the residence state and we aggregated the responses to the state level. 27 The NES does not always have all states in its survey. Of the 400 possible observations points for the 50 states between 1986 and 2000, we were able to obtain 285. To obtain data for all states we posited a model for the share of informed voters in a state as a general function of per capita income, urbanization rate and education in the state. We then used a second order Taylor approximation and obtained predicted values of the share of informed voters for all states. The predicted value is our voter information measure, which, according to the model, should have a negative effect on the number of PACs. The results on the contribution caps variable are not sensitive to the inclusion of this variable. 28 Tables 1a and 1b provide summary statistics of the variables and Table 5 describes their source and, when applicable, how we calculate them. Table 2a reports OLS estimates of equation (1E). 29 All the specifications include state and time effects that are not reported. Column 1 shows that a state's enactment of limits on campaign finance laws leads to a positive and significant effect on the number of PACs in that state. In section 5.5 we estimate that for sufficiently low caps the effect is actually negative as predicted by the model but it becomes positive for high enough caps. The results are not driven by any single state and remain unchanged if we re-estimate dropping one state at a time.
Estimation
In column 2 we introduce a measure for whether contributions from corporations and/or unions, that are not channeled through PACs, are prohibited by the state. These limits on PACs also increase the number of lobbies in a state by approximately the same magnitude as the caps. This result is consistent with the prediction of the extended version of our model: the reduction in contributions from corporations and unions increases the marginal benefit of contributions from PACs and therefore leads more of them to form. The last two columns are identical to the first two except that they exclude Nebraska. One of our instruments is not defined for that state so we exclude it here also in order to subsequently compare these results with the IV estimation. 27 We used linear interpolation for the two years in which the question was not asked (1994, 1998) . 28 More specifically we estimated a regression in logs of the share of informed voters on per capita income, urbanization rate, education and education squared, including also the interactions of all these variables and year dummies. Education is measured as the percent of individuals with at least a high school degree. 29 Although the dependent variable is "count data" OLS is appropriate because the number of PACs is fairly "continuous". Table 2a show the effects of contribution caps and the other covariates on the number of PAC sponsors. The results of caps on lobby formation are very similar to the results in the first two columns where the dependent variable was PACs, and the remaining covariates have an effect similar to the previous specifications. These results suggest that a PAC split-up effect is not a quantitatively important concern here. Because we are interested in PAC formation and the impact of contribution caps on the decision to form a PAC, the remaining specifications will have PACs, not sponsors, as the dependent variable.
Columns 3 and 4 of
Our proxy for industry bargaining power also has a positive effect on the number of lobbies, as predicted by the model. We also use the square of our HHI measure to capture the non-linearity in the effect of the variable on the expected number of lobbies formed. We expect the HHI variable to have a non-linear effect on the expected number of lobbies formed. An increase in specialization makes any given industry more likely to form a lobby. However, as employment becomes concentrated in fewer industries there will be fewer lobbies that will potentially form. Thus, we expect that at low levels of specialization (all industries active) an increase in the specialization increases lobby formation. We expect the opposite at high levels, and this is what we find, though the effects are not statistically significant. The geographic concentration measure has the hypothesized sign: states with higher shares of industries that are more highly regionally concentrated in some part of the country have a larger number of PACs. This variable does not vary much over time, which may explain why it is not statistically significant.
State per capita income is positively and significantly associated with increases in the number of PACs. Given how broad this measure is, any one specific interpretation is suspect. The relationship may be driven by the positive effect of income on an individual's political involvement (e.g. the share of registered voters increases with income). Moreover, increases in income also increase demand for certain government provided goods such as environmental protection, etc., thus increasing the return to lobbying on those issues. State income taxes have no statistically significant effect on lobby formation. 30 State population has a positive but insignificant effect; perhaps because population changes only slowly over time and the effect of state size is already absorbed by our state fixed effects.
The share of informed voters has the predicted negative effect on PAC formation. The point estimates are negative and statistically significant in all specifications, and they can be interpreted as elasticity estimates. They suggest that a one percent increase in the share of politically informed 30 The results are not sensitive to the exclusion of the income tax variable. voters leads to an approximately 0.6 percentage point decrease in the number of PACs. To our knowledge this is the first estimate of the direct effect of voter information on lobby formation. 31 The negative effect of voter information on PAC formation is the one predicted by the model and raises the interesting question of whether caps in states with high a have a stronger impact on PAC formation. This would be plausible according to the model if states with fewer formed lobbies also have a higher number of latent lobbies close to indifference between forming or not. Therefore in an alternative specification (not reported in the table), we interacted voter information with the cap indicator and found it has a positive and significant effect on PAC formation.
Endogeneity
There are two potential sources of endogeneity in our estimation. We already discussed the first: the possibility of omitted variable bias; the second is due to reverse causality. Voters may favor caps on contributions if they anticipate an increase in lobby activity due to new lobbies forming. This raises the possibility that the enactment of a campaign finance law in our analysis is endogenous since there may be unobserved variables that change over time that determine both lobby formation and consequently the passage of laws capping contributions. To address this possibility we apply instrumental variables.
Traditionally Democrats have favored limits on PAC contributions and we will use a set of instruments reflecting political control at the state level. More specifically, our instruments are the party affiliation of the governor, the composition of the legislature, and the ideology of the state electorate. Current work suggests that the political make-up of the state influences whether a state adopts campaign finance laws. For example, Pippen, Bowler, and Donovan (2002) hypothesize and find that state ideology is an important determinant of whether a state has stricter campaign finance laws. Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo (2005) find that electoral competition has a significant effect on the strictness of campaign finance laws. Conversely, there is no theory or evidence showing that the composition of the legislature or the affiliation of the Governor affects interest group formation (Boehmke 2002 ). Therefore we postulate that political control by Democrats versus Republicans is a determinant of campaign finance legislation but is uncorrelated with lobby formation. Ultimately this is an empirical question, for which we will provide some evidence via over-identifying restrictions tests. 31 The estimates for the coefficient on the information variable are similar if we exclude income per capita. As an alternative proxy for how informed voters are we also tried the percent of people in the state with 4 or fewer years of education. The point estimates for this alternative measure were not statistically significant in the OLS and 2SLS specifications, which is not surprising given that it is a considerably noisier measure of voter information.
We report the IV estimates in Table 3 . The associated first stage estimates are reported in the appendix. They show that our instruments are strongly correlated with contribution caps, as indicated by the low p-values for the F-statistic at the bottom of the table in the appendix. Because we have more instruments than endogenous variables we can use the over-identifying restrictions to test if the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the main equation and correctly excluded from it. We cannot reject this null hypothesis at any reasonable significance level, as indicated by the p-value for Hansen's J test in the bottom of Table 3 . This enhances our confidence in the exogeneity of the instruments. We also computed C-statistics, which similarly allow us to test whether a subset of our instruments are exogenous. Because these tests focus on a smaller number of instruments they have higher power than the basic over-identifying restriction test. We first computed one C-statistic for whether the party has the political control of the House and the governorship, and then another for our measures of constituency political preferences. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that either subset of instruments is uncorrelated with the error term in the main equation and correctly excluded from it. This result holds for all specifications in Table 3 and enhances our confidence that the instruments are valid.
The results in the first two columns of Table 3 are directly comparable to those in the last two columns of Table 2a and are qualitatively similar. The coefficient on the finance law remains positive and significant. Most notably the point estimate actually triples relative to the estimates for the same sample in Table 2a .
We believe that the basic insight of the model extends beyond the formation of industrial lobbies.
Nonetheless, we tested if the result was also present when we restrict the sample to include only corporation PACs (as defined by the FEC)-a subgroup that more closely corresponds to the SIGs in the model. The point estimate for contribution caps in a specification identical to column 1 in Table   3 is 0.34 with a standard error of 0.15.
Finally, we performed a Hausman test for whether the data suggest that campaign finance laws are in fact endogenous in the PAC formation regression. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the OLS estimates are consistent at the 10% and 5% level for the specifications in columns 1 and 2 respectively and at 10% for the specifications in the last two columns, which we discuss below. In sum, the over-identification restriction tests for various combinations of instruments all support their validity. Moreover, there is little evidence of endogeneity according to the Hausman tests in several specifications. Therefore the concerns with omitted variable bias and reverse causation do not appear to be very important in practice and so we focus on the more conservative OLS estimates.
Quantifying the Effects
We first compare the importance of the average effect of a change in the contribution law relative to that of other variables. We then augment (1E) to estimate and quantify the marginal effects of the law at different cap values for PAC contributions, since the model predicts these should be negative for low caps and positive for higher ones.
It is interesting to compare how important contribution limits are relative to lack of voter information in causing more PACs to form. According to a standard measure that accounts for the standard deviation in the regressors the contribution effect is about 5 times more important. 32 Alternatively, from the estimates of column 1 in Table 2a we can see that the effect of the limit in increasing PACs is equivalent to a 13% reduction in voter information. Only 1.5% of the state-year observations in our sample had reductions this large in voter information over any two year period. 33 The theoretical model offers other empirical predictions about the effect of caps on the number of lobbies. One that we already referred to is the effect of prohibitions on other sources of contributions. Imposing a prohibition on either corporations or unions increases the number of PACs by approximately the same magnitude as the laws that affect PAC contributions directly.
The model also predicts that sufficiently low contribution caps lower the gain to lobbying, thus reducing the number of lobbies that form. To estimate this effect we use additional information on the value of the cap. The general form of the equation that we now estimate, which allows for non-linear effects, is
In the first column of Table 2b we use κ(C it , δ) = δ 1 + δ 2 ln C it . Note that in this specification the interpretation of δ 1 is the effect of implementing a cap of $1. A cap of $1 leads to a 24% decrease in the number of lobbies, as predicted by the model. The positive coefficient on ln C it (that is, δ 2 )
indicates that conditional on having a cap, an increase in the cap leads to an increase in the number of lobbies. Hence, the negative effect given by δ 1 is fully offset if the chosen cap is sufficiently high.
According to the estimates in Table 2b column 1 if the cap is $673 then the campaign finance law 32 This refers to a comparison of the beta effects, which are defined as the product of the coefficient multiplied by the ratio of the standard deviation of the independent and dependent variable (e.g. for the limit the effect is 0.84*0.5/1.16=0.36 for the voter information variable it is -0.065).
33 Since we employ a proxy for the state variable our estimate of the parameter on the reform variable, 1(C it ), reflects not only the underlying parameter of interest, β but also the direct effect of the state variable on the proxy, denote that structural elasticity by θ. So we can't exactly quantify the effect of caps on state lobbies. But we can quantify the relative effect of two variables on state lobbies. To see this consider our estimate for two variables such as the cap and union prohibitions (or voter information). Suppose their only direct effect is on the state lobbies and it is β and γ respectively. By using the proxy we then obtain estimates for βθ and γθ respectively and therefore their ratio reflects their relative effect on state lobbies. has no effect on lobby formation. A law that implements any higher caps is predicted to increase the number of lobbies.
The finding that a sufficiently low cap reduces the number of lobbies is not consistent with the hypothesis that federal policies and lobbies are substituting for state lobbies. If that was the case then the strongest effect of a state cap on the number of federal lobbies would occur when that cap is at its lowest. The fact that both coefficients have the effect predicted by our theory on the number of state SIGs further supports our claim that we are capturing their effect on the underlying state variable rather than a spurious correlation of those variables with the federal proxy.
In Table 4 we list the states with limits. Out of the 36 states that had limits only in four of them is that limit below $673: Maine, Missouri, Minnesota and Oregon. The 10th percentile for the limit taken over all the states with limits is $1000 and the median is $2000. We can't reject the null hypothesis that the marginal effect of the law δ 1 + δ 2 ln C it is zero for any of the states with limits below the median. But we can reject it for states with contribution limits above the median. The results for the restricted sample are similar except that the point estimate for the critical value is lower because the state excluded in the restricted sample, Nebraska, has an abnormally high cap of $73,000, over three times the next highest cap and 30 times higher than the median.
There are alternative ways to specify the non-linearity. In specification (2) in Table 2b we estimate a more general form of (2E), namely κ(C it , δ) = δ 1 +δ 2 ln C it +δ 3 (ln C it ) 2 +δ 4 (ln C it ) 3 . The coefficients in this expression are not individually significant. However, they are jointly significant and therefore we calculate both a critical value and the marginal effects for different states. For states with caps above $2000 we reject the null hypothesis of no effect on the number of lobbies. So, according to this specification, 23 of the 36 states with limits the cap significantly increased the number of lobbies.
The final point to note from Table 4 is that most states for which the predicted effect is not statistically significant set their limits in or before 1986. Had their laws allowed for the nominal values of their limits to be adjusted for inflation their limits would be higher today and therefore it could be possible for their effect to be significant (naturally this could also have implied a change in the estimated coefficients). The states that changed their limits during the sample period in our analysis typically have higher limits and therefore are more likely to have a significant effect.
Discussion and Conclusions
The influence of money on elections and policy outcomes is a major public issue in democratic countries. A system with unregulated contributions provides a disproportionate amount of political power to individuals or groups with economic power or low cost of organizing. It is therefore attractive to limit the amount that individuals or groups may contribute as part of campaign finance reform.
In this paper, we argue that caps on contributions may in fact worsen the problem by providing an incentive for new lobbies to form. We provide a simple model to show when this outcome might occur and empirical evidence that caps have led to an increase in the number of lobbies in U.S. states.
We would not however argue that on the basis of these results contribution caps should simply be abandoned as a part of campaign finance reform. We would argue instead that, in the context of this model, if contribution caps are used, they must either be sufficiently low or be complemented by measures that offset the gains to lobbying, thus reducing the incentive for new lobbies to form. We explore some of these reforms in our working paper. A more definitive policy conclusion also needs to take other factors into account that our model did not address. These include the effect of lobbies on influencing the ideological content of policy (rather than simply its distributional effects), as well as a more precise specification of how politicians use campaign contributions.
How might these other factors affect our results? On the first issue, an argument put forward for caps is that they "level the playing field" by limiting the ability of lobbies that are better funded to have a disproportionate influence on policy. We do not disagree with this possibility, but our paper explores a downside to contribution caps that has been ignored, namely, the possibility that they strengthen the bargaining position of lobbies for whom the cap is binding, and thus may increase the number of lobbies.
If constrained lobbies find their bargaining power strengthened, this suggests that in fact rather than "leveling" the playing field, contribution caps may make it even more unequal for existing lobbies.
The basic argument for the beneficial effect of caps is that in the absence of caps rich lobbies will contribute more and thus have more influence, while a cap that is set to constrain the richer lobbies but not the poorer ones will make their contributions, and thus influence, more equal. However, if the cap binds only on the richer lobbies, then our model says that the bargaining position of the poorer lobbies will not be affected by the cap, while that of the richer ones will be increased. Hence, rather than leveling the playing field, caps may actually do the opposite and tilt it even further.
In cases when richer and poorer lobbies compete directly with each other it is possible that contribution caps strengthen the relative position of smaller existing lobbies. However, this level-theplaying-field effect has an ambiguous impact on the formation of new lobbies. One must ask what is the net benefit to a new lobby of organizing if there is a cap relative to the benefit if there is no cap.
This will depend not only on the effect of the cap on the return to being a lobby, but also on the value to remaining unorganized. Consider a world where our bargaining effect is not present, but there is competition between differentially wealthy lobbies. The cap reduces the influence of the (large) already organized lobby as it attains a lower level of the policy that hurts potentially competing lobbies. Hence the assumption that lobbies have competing interests implies that the welfare of the unorganized, competing lobby has risen. (This effect is not present in our model because there are no opposing interests). A cap therefore increases the reservation value of remaining unorganized and makes the opposing lobby less likely to organize. Therefore in a model of opposing lobbies it is possible that a cap will lead to lower lobby formation. In sum, the effect of a cap on lobby formation and on welfare would depend on the details of the model. Taken together, these possible effects of caps on lobby influence in a bargaining model lead us to a number of conclusions. First, the effect of caps on the relative policy influence of competing lobbies is not obvious and could be complex when caps may strengthen the position of lobbies differentially.
Seriously addressing questions of lobby competition or whether there is a beneficial effect of caps via "leveling the playing field" requires a significant extension of the analysis presented here. These are highly worthwhile topics for further research, which could try to test the predictions of such a model for lobby formation against the channel we emphasize. Second, the result that caps may have the opposite effect than their intended purpose that we explored in a model largely abstracting from lobby competition may hold as well when lobby competition is important. Moreover, the possible effect of contribution caps in exacerbating rather than reducing differences in lobby influence would obtain for the basic reason we stress here, namely, strengthening the bargaining power of those lobbies the caps are meant to constrain. Policy conclusions on the beneficial effects of caps when there is lobby competition have been based on analyses that ignore the effect of caps on the bargaining position of existing lobbies and the incentives for new ones to form. Our results thus suggest the need for caution in drawing these policy conclusions.
On the uses of contributions, an especially interesting extension would be to explicitly model elections and the use of contributions to fund political advertising, as in Prat (2002) and Coate (2004) . We believe that our basic result that contribution caps will increase the number of lobbies will still hold if lobbies also provide information in addition to contributions, though the welfare implications will be more complicated. 34 Our results raise the obvious question of how allowing the 34 As Coate shows, the welfare implications of restricting contributions depends on how they are used. If they are used to buy favors, as in our model, banning them may be socially optimal, while if they finance directly informative advertising about candidate quality, restricting them may actually lower social welfare. Moreover, when contributions finance policy favors, campaign advertising itself is less effective in conveying information on candidate quality. We further conjecture that if ads are a less efficient way of benefiting the politician than a cash transfer, then our results on the effect of restricting contributions would be similar. The reason is that as the more efficient form of transfer number of lobbies to change in response to campaign finance reform will affect the desirability or undesirability of limiting contributions that finance provision of information to voters.
There are other interesting avenues for future work. One is to analyze the impact of caps in the presence of lobbies that have asymmetries along dimensions other than organization costs, such as differences in bargaining power and lobby size. Although we do not expect the qualitative result of entry to change, the effect on total contributions and the amount of new distortions will certainly be different and it may generate additional interesting testable predictions. It would also be interesting to empirically test some of these predictions on industry or firm data to determine the importance of our channel on the probability of formation of corporate PACs relative to firm specific determinants.
Finally, a broader implication of our results is that modeling the endogenous response of lobby formation is crucial in evaluating the outcome of reforms. This is certainly true for political contributions but also applies to other political or economic reforms in areas where politicians and SIG interact. Such an analysis is particularly important when that interaction is characterized by bargaining since in those settings conventional wisdom and simple intuition often fail.
(cash) is restricted, more of the alternative form is used, but since the latter is relatively less efficient, it improves the bargaining position of the lobby. This insight is analogous to the results in , who show how the government improves its bargaining position and can thus benefit by choosing a relatively less efficient policy to redistribute towards lobbies.
APPENDIX Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1 i. Sufficiency
Suppose that λ ∈ (0, 1). We need only show the existence of a cap C i < C * s.t. V (C,t) > V (C * , t * ). The solution is illustrated in Figure 2 . We first show that the constrained Pareto frontier is strictly concave. The constrained Pareto frontier in Figure 2 coincides with the original one for C i ≥ C * and thus its slope is simply V C G C = −1 before the cap binds. From (6) we have
The rest of the constrained frontier is strictly interior to the unconstrained one since by imposing a constraint on the problem in (8), we are reducing the total surplus when the constraint is binding. The slope of the Pareto frontier when the constraint binds is Vt G t , reflecting the ratio of changes in welfare as the amount of the production subsidy changes.
Moreover,
Gt(t<t * ) , where the first equality is due to the definitions of G and V , the second follows from (7), and the inequality from noting that at the constrained optimum there are joint gains from increasing t towards the unconstrained optimum t * (see Figure 1) . Now define point A in Figure 2 as the intersection of the constrained frontier and V = v N . Since the constrained frontier is strictly concave and v mc = v m for C i ≥ C 0 , i.e. for all caps above the minimum contribution that maintains the government at g 0 given t = t * (see Figure 1) , the segment connecting v m and A is everywhere below the constrained Pareto frontier. Consider then an auxiliary problem where the Pareto frontier is defined by the straight line through v m and A, which has some slope m. For any linear Pareto frontier the lobby's equilibrium utility is V * − v 0 = λ(v m − v 0 ), which is easily shown by redefining (9) and confirming we again obtain (11). Since the straight line through v m and A is a rotation of the original Pareto frontier inwards around v m , and since v m − v 0 and λ are unchanged in the auxiliary problem, the equilibrium lobby utility is also unchanged. Therefore if we now re-derive the first-order condition, as we do for (8), we obtain − U G U V | A = m. Strict concavity of the constrained frontier implies that at A, m > V t G t | A , the slope of the constrained frontier at A. Therefore, the equilibrium point N C lies to the northwest of A, implying v Nc > v N . Following a similar argument we can show that when λ ∈ (0, 1) we have V (C,t) > V (C * , t * ) for any C i ∈ [C 0 , C * ).
Necessity: see part (ii) ii. If λ = 1 then the unconstrained solution is v m ≡ Max C,t V s.t. G = g 0 . The equilibrium contribution is C * (λ = 1) = C 0 . A strictly binding cap entails that the lobby's utility is now v mc ≡ Max C,T V s.t. G = g 0 and C i < C * , the extra constraint implies that v mc < v m . If λ = 0 then V = v 0 for any cap. This also proves the necessity of the condition λ ∈ (0, 1) in (i).
iii. From (11) we know
iv. A binding cap C j ∈ [0, ∞) changes the government's reservation utility in bargaining with i to g 00 and it also changes its maximum utility to g m0 . The additive separability of policies in different sectors in G implies that t * in 7 is unchanged. Therefore contributions are used as before to distribute the surplus g m 0 − g 00 . But additive separability also implies that the change in g m and g 0 is identical so g m 0 − g 00 = g m − g 0 . Moreover, since v m − v 0 = g m − g 0 and v 0 = l i + π(p) (recall α i −→ 0) we have that lobby i's utility, in (11) is unchanged.
Proposition 2
i. This follows immediately from (14), the definition of F (n) with F 0 (n) > 0, and the independence of V u from caps and n.
ii
)/(n * /C * ) > 1, where we use (14) to obtain
F 0 (n) . Since both dV /(−dC) and C * are independent of n the condition is satisfied if F 0 (n * ) is sufficiently low. Alternatively if F (n = 0) is sufficiently high then, from (14), the initial number of lobbies n * is sufficiently low and ε nκ > 1.
iii. The effect of tightening the cap on the total level of subsidies for the set of lobbies L 0 that includes the previously and newly organized sectors is
. Since
Rewriting in terms of the elasticity of the subsidy rate,
, we have:
Since ε T κ is independent of n the condition ε T κ + ε nκ > 0 is satisfied if either F 0 (n * ) is sufficiently low or F (n = 0) is sufficiently high. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Robust standard errors in parentheses. .* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. State and year effects included in all specifications but not reported. 1. The R-squared refers to the regression using deviations from the state means. 2. Contribution caps above this value imply larger number of PACs relative to no cap. 3. Probability value of joint test of significance of the coefficients in (δ 1 + δ 2 lnC)*1(C) it for (1) and (1r) and (δ 1 + δ 2 lnC + δ 3 (lnC) 2 + δ 4 (lnC) 3 )*1(C) it for (2) and (2r). 0.076*** 0.064** 0.073*** 0.047 LA † 5000 *** *** *** * OH † 5000 *** *** *** * MD † 6000 *** *** *** * NY † 6200 *** *** *** * NC 8000 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.086*** ID † 10000 *** *** *** *** NH 10000 *** *** *** *** NV † 10000 *** *** *** *** OK 10000 *** *** *** *** TN † 10000 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11*** NJ † 11800 *** *** *** *** CO † 20000 *** *** *** *** NE † 73000 0.20*** 0.34*** 0.18*** 0.86*** 1. ∂E(ln n |ln C)/∂1(C)=δ 1 +δ 2 lnC for (1) and (1r) and δ 1 +δ 2 lnC +δ 3 (lnC) 2 +δ 4 (lnC) 3 for (2) and (2r) in table 2b. The asterisks represent the level at which we can reject the null of ∂E(ln n |ln C)/∂1(C)=0 using a Wald test. 10% (*); 5%(**) and 1%(***). 2. OR had a limit only in 1996. MO had a limit in 1996 ($500) and 1998 ($550).
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† Denotes states that imposed limits after 1986. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Standard errors in parentheses. State and year effects included but not reported. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In this table column 1 corresponds to the first stage regression of Table 3 , column 1. Column 2 corresponds to the first stage of Table 3 , column2. The first stages of Table 3 , column 3 are the columns 1 and 3 of this table. The first stages of Table 3 , column 4 are columns 1, 3, and 4 of this table. 1. P-value of the F-test of joint significance of the instruments in first-stage regression
